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Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions in China:
A Test of the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis
Yane Chandera* and Lukas Setia-Atmaja**

Prasetiya Mulya School of Business and Economics, Indonesia
This research investigates whether Chinese cross-border investments have positive impact on
shareholders wealth and whether the amount of bidders’ free cash flow influences the shareholder
returns resulted from the acquisitions. The sample is based on 77 top Chinese cross-border investments during the years 2005-2009 with each deal value of minimum US$100 million. The assessments
of acquisition abnormal returns are based on the event study methodology (Brown & Warner, 1985).
Cross-sectional regression analysis is used to determine the bidding firms factors which significantly
affect the returns. Factors are examined using OLS with White’s heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors, since the assumption of homoscedasticity is likely to be violated. The study proves Chinese cross- border acquisitions result in positive abnormal returns which is consistent with synergy
hypothesis. The amount of bidders’ free cash flow is also found to be marginally but positively associated with shareholders return which is consistent with Myers and Majluf’s pecking order hypothesis
but unsupportive of Jensen’s free cash flow hypothesis.
Keywords: value creation, cross-border transaction, China, event study, abnormal return, cumulative
abnormal return, free cash flow

Introduction
Chinese companies started conducting
cross-border mergers and acquisitions around
the 1980s. In 1999, the Chinese government
launched “Go Global” policy and since that era,
cross-border transactions were actively undertaken and mainly done by large state owned enterprises (Chen & Young, 2010). Originally, it
was a small transaction and focus on monopoly
industries such as aviation and mineral resources (Liao, 2006).
After the launching of “Go Global” policy
and especially after the China involvement in
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001,
China entered the second wave of cross-border

transactions. During these periods, the mergers and acquisitions were characterized by an
increase in both scale and speed with a larger
number of successful deals and most of deal
sizes were more than US$100 million; more
private companies were doing the acquisitions;
and more diverse countries of target companies
not only in Asia but also in North America, Europe, Australia, and Africa. Furthermore, most
of these acquisitions were horizontal acquisitions and motivated by the acquisitions of higher technology possessed by target companies
(Liao, 2006).
In that second era, Chinese government had
a big role in the increasing number of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. It influenced not
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only by its involvement in the management and
ownership of the large Chinese corporations but
also by its policies which supported government
objectives to support domestic companies in
the acquisition of advanced technology, brand
names, and modern manufacturing know-how
(Schuller and Turner, 2005; Wong and Chan,
2003; Zhan, 1995). The policies included the
relaxation of capital controls and the offering
of special loan programs. They also involved
the issuance of a joint circular on the establishment of programs to facilitate overseas investment in natural resources and strategic assets in
November 2004 by the National Development
and Reform Commission; and the Export–Import Bank of China. The global financial crisis
which happened in 2008 also played a major
part in this second wave of cross border mergers
and acquisitions since Chinese firms considered
the prices of these ailing target companies especially in North America and Europe as cheap or
at bargain (Chen & Young, 2010).
The purpose of this research is to investigate whether the top Chinese cross-border investments have had a positive impact on the
bidding firm shareholders wealth in the years
2005-2009, which is consistent with the synergy hypothesis. The research will also examine
whether the amount of free cash flow owned by
the acquirers positively affects the shareholders
returns resulted from the acquisitions, which is
consistent with Myers and Majluf’s pecking order hypothesis.

Literature Review
The impact of mergers and acquisitions on
the bidders’ shareholders wealth can be explained mainly by either synergy hypothesis
or managerialism hypothesis. The synergy hypothesis proposes that acquisitions would take
place and create value for shareholders if the
combined value of the two firms is greater than
the sum of the values of the individual firms
(Bradley et al., 1988; Seth, 1990a; Weston et
al., 2004). The additional value created from
the acquisition is then shared between the bidder and the target. Some previous studies report positive returns to acquirers and support
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the synergy hypothesis (Maquieira et al., 1998;
Kohers and Kohers, 2000; Andrade et al. 2001).
The reason why the combined value can be
greater than the sum of the individual values is
based on the Penrose’s firm growth explanation (Penrose, 1959). According to Penrose,
each firm tries to seek new products and markets in which a firm can efficiently use both of
its tangible and intangible assets to increase its
profitability. These assets, which are unique
and specialized resources, are considered as
“excess” resources. These “excess” resources
may increase other firm’s profitability but the
transfer of these “excess” resources is not free
because there will be some market frictions between these firms. If both firms are merged or
consolidated, they would be able to eliminate
some or all of the frictions and create a synergy.
According to Trautwein, a synergy can be
distinguished into three types: financial synergy, operational synergy, and managerial synergy (Trautwein, 1990; Yook, 2003). A financial synergy is created if after the acquisition,
the firm would have a lower cost of capital.
The lower cost of capital can be achieved by
decreasing the amount of systematic risk after
the merger, access to cheaper capital market because the firm’s size has increased, or the improvement in internal capital market because
the capital can be allocated more efficiently.
An operational synergy is created if the firm
can now operate more efficiently by combining
two separate business units or by knowledge
transfers (Porter, 1985). Finally, a managerial synergy is created if the firm can lower the
cost of managing the combined firm because
the bidder’s management team possesses superior planning and monitoring abilities that benefit the target’s firm performance (Trautwein,
1990).
Furthermore, based on where the target firm
is located, a merger or acquisition can broadly be categorized as domestic or cross-border
transactions. If a local company acquires another local company, therefore it is considered
as a domestic transaction. However, if a local
company acquires a foreign company, then it is
considered as a cross-border transaction. According to synergy hypothesis, both domestic
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and cross-border transactions might face some
market frictions which could be eliminated if
the firms are doing some collaboration in the
form of mergers or acquisitions. The elimination of these market frictions would eventually
result in synergy which increases the value of
the firms involved in the mergers.
The foreign direct investment (FDI) theory
is aligned with the synergy hypothesis in the
context of cross-border merger and acquisitions.
Based on the FDI theory, in cross-border
transactions, the financial synergy, operational
synergy, and managerial synergy would be
somewhat different. For instance, firms will
invest abroad when growth at home is limited
in the presence of trade barriers which restrict
exports (Penrose, 1959). Furthermore, tax
differentials (Manzon et al., 1994), exchange
rate variations (Markides and Ittner, 1994), and
international diversifications (Markides and
Ittner, 1994; Shimizu et al., 2004) are considered
to be associated with synergy creation in crossborder transactions.
Unlike the synergy hypothesis, managerialism hypothesis proposes that merger and acquisition would decrease the bidder’s shareholders
value. The theory is originally described by
Marris (1964) and is also called as the “conflict-of-interest” hypothesis by Seyhun (1990)
as well as “agency” hypothesis by Berkovitch
and Narayan (1993). The reason why the value
is destroyed rather than created is due to the
two main reasons: the link between manager’s
compensation and firm size, and the well integrated capital market.
According to Marris, manager’s compensation is frequently tied to the amount of assets
under their control. In other words, the bigger
the company’s size, the higher the manager’s
individual benefits. Therefore, managers will
tend to prioritize growth of assets rather than of
profits (Mueller, 1969) and they tend to knowingly overpay in takeovers (Berkovitch and
Narayanan, 1993). This is also consistent with
the empire building hypothesis (Shleifer and
Vishny, 1989).
The second underlying explanation of managerialism is the fact that the capital market is
already well integrated nationally and interna-

tionally, so the shareholders can do the diversification by themselves. If a firm would like
to acquire other firms merely for diversification
purposes, the acquisition will actually benefit
the managers and harm the shareholders. In
other words, the value has been transferred
from bidder’s shareholders to the managers of
acquiring firms. Some previous studies report
negative returns to acquirers and support the
managerialism hypothesis (Mitchell and Stafford, 2000; Walker, 2000; and Houston et al.,
2001).
After determining whether the top Chinese
cross-border transactions would support synergy or managerialism hypothesis, this research
would also determine the impact of the bidder’s
free cash flow on the shareholders’ return. There
are two theories that might explain the relationship between the amounts of bidders’ free cash
flow prior to acquisition and the shareholders’
return after the acquisition. These theories are
Jensen’s free cash flow theory and Myers and
Majluf’s pecking order theory.
The Jensen’s free cash flow theory proposes that there is a negative association between
the bidder’s free cash flow and shareholders’
return. According to Jensen, free cash flow is
“cash flow in excess of that required to fund all
projects that have positive net present values
when discounted at the relevant cost of capital”.
This excess cash would motivate the managers
to act not in the shareholders interests. In other
words, they would tend to invest it at below the
cost of capital or wasting it on organization inefficiency. Accordingly, the free cash flow theory
predicts that firms with high amount of free cash
flow would tend to destroy rather than to create
value for the shareholders if they merge with or
acquire other companies (Jensen, M.C., 1986).
Furthermore, according to Doukas (1995), foreign acquisition announcements by firms with
high cash flow and a low q will decrease the
bidder’s shareholders wealth significantly. In
other words, firms without growth opportunities and substantial free cash flow would tend to
accept investment projects with negative cash
flow or overinvest (Doukas, 1995).
Quite contrary to Jensen’s free cash flow
theory, Myers and Majluf’s pecking order theo-
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ry states that there is a positive association between the bidder’s free cash flow and shareholders’ return. Stockholders are better off ex
ante – i.e., on average when the firm carries sufficient financial slack to undertake good investment opportunities as they arise (Myers and
Majluf, 1984). Undervalued firms lacking financial slack sometimes forgo investments to
avoid transferring wealth to new investors (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Therefore high free cash
flow firms combined with slack poor target
would be expected to generate more positive
total returns. Furthermore, returns of bidders
with high free cash flow are more positive when
the acquisition results in increased use of debt
reduced liquid assets and the target is slack poor
(Smith and Kim, 1994). In their model, firms
with plenty of slack should seek out acquisition
targets which have good investment opportunities and limited slack, and about which investors have limited information in order to make
both the bidders and target’s shareholders better
off ex ante (Myers and Majluf, 1984).
A previous study of 27 Chinese cross-border
mergers and acquisition activities that took
place on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets between 2000 and 2004, finds out that acquisitons create value for the Chinese acquiring
firms (Agyenim et al., 2008). The primary motives of these acquisitions are increasing market
share, promoting diversification, and obtaining
foreign advanced technology and other resources (Agyenim et al., 2008). Another recent study
also finds that factors which would positively
influence the returns of Chinese outward foreign direct investment are the size of the bidder,
the advance of target’s technological capabilities, and the amount of bidder financial assets
(Cui and Jiang, 2010). Therefore the corresponding hypothesis is
H1: The shareholders of the Chinese acquiring
firms engaged in cross-border mergers and
acquisitions will earn positive abnormal returns
A study of a set of all UK takeovers of listed domestic companies by UK plcs between
January 1984 and December 1992 reveals that
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Jensen’s free cash flow theory does not hold.
The higher the amount of free cash flow owned
by the bidder, the better the performance of the
acquirers (Gregory, 2005; Rau and Vermaelen,
1998). The studies propose that the higher the
level of free cash flow that the acquirer has, the
better the company manages the financial distress which might happen after the acquisition
(Gregory, 2005). The proxies used in this study
is similar to those used by Lang, Stulz and
Walking (1991). Furthermore, the bidder with
enough free cash flow would be able to take
valuable acquisition opportunities without having to generate outside financing such as issuing
stocks or bonds. This ideal condition would be
positively rewarded through favorable market
reaction around announcement periods. This
research result is compatible with the pecking order theory (Myers, 1984) and empirical
findings of Shayam-Sunder and Myers (1999).
Therefore the correponding hypothesis is
H2: There is a positive and significant association between the level of the acquirer’s free
cash flow and the acquirer’s abnormal returns

Research Method
The study sample is based on 77 top Chinese cross-border investments during the years
2005-2009. The acquirer’s stock prices, accounting data, and all other information about
the acquisitions are available in the Capital IQ.
If the acquirer announces more than one transaction in one year, then only the first transaction
is included. Furthermore, to limit the research
only on big Chinese acquisitions, each transaction should have a deal value of minimum
US$100 million to be included the sample.
The assessments of the economic outcomes
of the deals are based on the event study methodology (Brown & Warner, 1985). Market is
assumed to be reasonably efficient where all
currently available information is incorporated
in the firm’s share price. Therefore the stock
prices are the reflection of the new information
released. The difference between actual and
predictive returns surrounding the announce-
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ment day is defined as the abnormal return.
The cumulative abnormal returns during a given time period is then obtained by summing up
the abnormal returns for each day during that
period.
The Shanghai All A-Share Index and Shenzhen All A-Share Index are used as the proxies for the market portfolio similar with most
of Chinese research (Liu and Li, 2000). The index’s returns during the estimation period are
regressed against the acquirer’s stock returns to
obtain the acquirer’s beta value which will be
used to estimate the acquirer’s returns around
announcement periods. Estimation period is set
at 250 to 50 days or about six months prior to
the event period (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997).
The estimated stock return for a given stock i
in the event window period is obtained using
equation (1):
Ē it = αi + βi Rmt

(1)

Ē it is the predicted stock i’s return at time t
and αi, βi are the regression parameters obtained
from the estimation period. Rmt is the stock market index m daily return observed at time t. The
stock i’s abnormal return at time t is then obtained by substracting predicted stock i’s return
from the actual stock i’s return.
ARit = Rit - Ē it

(2)

The cumulative abnormal return for stock i
is the summation of stock i’s abnormal return
during an event window period (t0, t1).
CARi(t0, t1) =

(3)

To test the significance of the abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns, the
ratio of day t average abnormal returns to its
estimated standard deviation is calculated using
equations (4) and (5) (Brown and Warner,1985;
Panayides and Gong, 2002).
(4)
(5)

Where:
and

To test the second hypothesis, cross-sectional regression analysis is used to determine the
bidding firms factors which significantly affect
the returns. Specifically, the factors are examined using OLS with White’s heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors, since the assumption of homoscedasticity is likely to be violated.
The cumulative abnormal returns are regressed
against the acquirer’s operating free cash flow
(Freund, et.al, 2003), the acquirer’s past accounting performance which is represented by
its ROE (Kohers, 2001), the type of industry
as well as the time of acquisition (Chen and
Young, 2010).
The acquirer’s operating free cash flow
which acts as the independent variable is measured according to the method used by Freund,
et.al, (2003), McLaughlin, Safieddine, and Vasudevan (1996), Lang and Litzenberger (1989),
and Lehn and Poulsen (1989) and showed in
equation (6):
FCF = OI – TAX – INTEX – PFDIV
– COMDIV

(6)

Where

OI = the operating income before depreciation
TAX = total taxes
INTEX = Interest expense on debt
PFDIV = Dividends paid to preferred stockholders
COMDIV = Dividends paid to common stockholders

The free cash flow is then divided by the
firm’s book value of its assets in the year before
the merger.
The acquirer’s ROE is chosen as the first
control variable because based on previous
studies, a firm’s accounting-based performance
significantly and positively affects the market
91
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Table 1. Summary Statistics: Bidders Cumulative Abnormal Returns, Free Cash Flow,
Return on Equity, Industry Type, and the Time of Announcement
Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev.
Observations

CAR (-1,0)
0.059%
-0.067%
8.634%
-14.763%
3.910%
72

CAR(-1,1)
0.467%
0.380%
11.259%
-14.884%
4.447%
72

CAR(-2,2)
0.654%
0.613%
17.995%
-16.269%
6.583%
72

CAR(-3,3)
0.830%
1.541%
16.422%
-25.767%
8.052%
72

FCF
0.064
0.041
0.338
-0.221
0.090
72

ROE
0.157
0.125
2.718
-0.365
0.344
72

IND
0.903
1
1
0
0.298
72

TIME
0.556
1
1
0
0.500
72

Table 2. Bidders’ Daily Abnormal Returns and Significance Test Statistics for Bidders’ Daily
Abnormal Returns Around the Announcement Date
Day
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
-3

AR(%)
0.030%
0.498%
0.462%
0.260%
0.056%
-0.206%
0.026%

t-Statistic
0.091
1.515*
1.405*
0.790
0.169
-0.626
0.080

*significant at the 10% level, one-tailed t- test

perception of an acquisition announcement
(Kohers, 2001). It means that market will predict an acquisition would be successful if the
acquirer has a good accounting-based performance. The second control variable which is
a dummy variable is used to differentiate between firms in financial industry and non-financial industry. The last control variable is a time
dummy to take into account the effect of global
financial recession and the implementation of
China’s Anti Monopoly Law in 2008.
Equation (7) is the corresponding multivariate regression equation that will be used to test
the second hypothesis:
CARi = α + β1(FCF)i + β2(ROE)i + β3(IND)i +
β4(TIME)i+εi
(7)
Where
CARi = the cummulative abnormal return
around the announcement date for
firm i
FCFi = the amount of the company i’s free
cash flow before the acquisition announcement scaled by the company i’
s book value of assets
ROEi = the company i’s percentage return
on equity before the acquisition announcement
INDi = dummy variable indicating the indus-
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try type of the company i, taking value of 1 if company i is a non-financial
industry firm
TIMEi = dummy variable indicating the time
the company i announces the acquisition, taking the value of 1 if the acquisition announced after the year of
2007

Result and Discussion
The acquirer’s abnormal returns are measured during three-day period (three days before
and three days after) the announcement day.
During these three-day periods, the average abnormal returns of all firms in the sample show
positive returns except for the second day before the announcement. On the first and second
day after announcement, the average abnormal
return is positive at 10% level, one-tailed t test.
Similar results are also observed after calculating the acquirer’s cumulative abnormal
returns during four different event window periods.
H0: CAR (t1-t2) ≤ 0
H1: CAR (t1-t2) > 0
During four different event window periods, the acquirer’s mean cumulative abnormal
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Table 3. Bidders’ Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Significance Test Statistics for Bidders’
Cumulative Abnormal Returns Around the Announcement Date
CAR (-1,0)
77
0.308%
-0.073%
-14.763%
16.636%
0.663

N
MEAN
MEDIAN
MIN
MAX
t-Statistic

CAR (-1,1)
77
0.772%
0.448%
-14.884%
14.814%
1.356*

CAR (-2,2)
77
1.057%
0.787%
-16.269%
19.495%
1.438*

CAR (-3,3)
77
1.111%
1.374%
-25.767%
17.566%
1.277

*significant at the 10% level, one-tailed t- test

Table 4. The Impact of the Amount of Free Cash Flow on the Bidder’s Cumulative Abnormal
Return Method: Least Squares with White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard
Errors & Covariance
Variable
Intercept
FCF
ROE
IND
TIME
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)
Durbin-Watson stat

Coefficient
0.053447
0.107830
0.022990
-0.044982
-0.030326
0.148432
0.097592
0.062530
0.261973
100.019000
2.919589
0.027448
1.960000

Std. Error
0.018187
0.065495
0.007646
0.015161
0.015396

t-Statistic
2.938702***
1.646393*
3.006658***
-2.966948***
-1.969779**

***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively in two-tailed test

returns are all positives. The mean cumulative
abnormal returns for the buyer during one-day
period and two-day period are 0.772% and
1.057% respectively. Although weakly significant, the result shows that market perceives
cross-border acquisitions made by top Chinese
companies during the period of 2005-2009 is a
value creation action for the bidder’s shareholders. These positive announcement period stock
returns of the acquirers are consistent with the
synergy hypothesis.
The association between shareholders returns and the amount of free cash flow after
controlling for some key variables is observed
from the regression results. Specifically, the
firm’s cumulative abnormal returns during twoday period are regressed against the bidder’s
free cash flow scaled by the book value of assets of the buyer, the bidder’s ROE, an industry
type dummy variable and a time dummy variable. The adjusted R-squared of the regression
is 9.759% with the F-value of 2.920 which is
significant at the 5% level.

Contrary from the free cash flow
theory(Jensen, M.C., 1986) and supportive of
pecking order theory(Myers and Majluf, 1984),
the amount of the bidder’s free cash flow is positively related to its stock price abnormal return
during the announcement period. The coefficient of free cash flow is positive (0.108) and
marginally significant at the 10% level. The
result shows that during announcement period, the firm’s stock abnormal returns rise by
0.108% for every percentage point increase in
the free cash flow of the acquirer.
Although weakly significant, our findings
are consistent with the latest finding by Gregory
(2011) which proves the hypotheses that high
free cash flow firms will out-perform low free
cash flow firms in a UK market context. In their
models, it was discovered that the coefficient
of free cash flows in all models are positives
although insignificant. Especially in model 2
where the experiment is repeated using FCFLowQ, a proxy for FCF in low q firms to address the Jensen problem, it turns out that the
93
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coefficients are still positives, although weakly
significant, at the 10% level with t = 1.77 and
t = 1.92 in both models. Therefore, contrary to
Jensen’s theory, there is no hint as well in our
sample that the amount of free cash flow is associated with lower abnormal returns. In fact,
in our sample, for one percentage point increase
in the amount of free cash flow of the Chinese
acquirers, the abnormal returns will increase by
more than 0.10 percent.
Controlling variables are also statistically
significant and showing expected signs. Return
on the equity of the buyer in the year before the
merger is positively related to the stock price
abnormal return during the announcement period at the 1% level. This indicates that market
has a tendency to extrapolate bidder’s past performance, in this case, the bidder’s past profitability into the future (Rau and Vermaelen,
1998). Furthermore, market is more confident
about the merger’s success if the acquirer has
good past performance (Kohers and Kohers,
2000). The cofficient of dummy variable for
buyer in a non-financial industry firm is negative and siginificant at 1% level, which indicates that bidders in financial industry seems
to perform better than bidders in non-financial
industry. Abnormal returns for cross border
acquisitions which happened after the year of
2007 are also siginificantly lower than before
the year of 2007 at 5% level. This might be related to the negative impact of global financial
recession and the implementation of China’s
Anti Monopoly Law in 2008.

Conclusion
After becoming a member of the World
Trade Organization in 2001, China entered the
second wave of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Cross-border transactions in China
were not only increasing in numbers but also
characterized by an increase in scale. There are
larger number of successful deals and most of
deal sizes were more than US$100 million. Unlike the first wave of acquisitions which were
dominated by state owned enterprises, during
the second wave, the more private companies
are now doing the acquisitions. Furthermore,
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the target companies locations are not only in
Asia but also in North America, Europe, Australia, and Africa.
The research first objective is to determine
whether the second wave of Chinese cross-border mergers and acquisitions adds value to the
bidders’ shareholders . The empirical study on
77 top Chinese cross-border investments during
the years 2005-2009, proves Chinese top crossborder acquisitions result in positive abnormal
returns. Therefore, consistent with synergy hypothesis, the market perceives Chinese firms
would create synergies by acquiring foreign
firms. (Bradley et al., 1988;Seth, 1990a; Weston et al., 2004).
The research second objective is to determine whether the amount of free cash flow
possesed by the bidders is associated with the
shareholders’ return. The empirical study on
77 top Chinese cross-border investments during the years 2005-2009, proves the amount of
free cash flow is marginally but positively associated with the abnormal returns around announcement periods. The market perceives that
bidders with sufficent financial slack would perform better after acquisition. This is due to the
fact that after the acquisition, firms would pose
several challenges such as cultural, currency,
and other problems inherent in international
operations (Shaked et al.,1991; Harris and Ravenscraft, 1991). Therefore, Chinese firms with
enough free cash flow would be capable of
managing these challenges better than those
without enough financial slack. Also, with adequate amount of financial slack, Chinese firms
would not have to seek recourse in capital market to finance positive investment opprtunities.
This research result is consistent with pecking
order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984) but unsupportive of free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen,
M.C., 1986).
Our model is based on previous works following Lang, Stulz and Walking (1991) and
Gregory (2005) where the announcement period returns are simply and directly regressed
against free cash flow as independent variable.
For further research, it might be necessary to
explore whether the amount of free cash flow
has indirect impact on the bidder’s cumulative
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abnormal return since the amount of free cash
flow itself might not only have the direct effect
but might in fact have some kind of indirect interactions or act as intervening variables which
will affect the abnormal announcement returns.
It is also advisable for further research to employ other more advanced statistical analysis to
test the significance of the impact of free cash
flow amount on the bidder’s cumulative abnormal returns.
The study has some theoretical contributions and practical implications for academicians, investors, managers and regulators.
For academicians, this empirical study on 77
top Chinese cross-border investments during

the years 2005-2009 has provided additional
evidence that supports synergy hypothesis in
cross-border transactions as well as pecking order theory. For investors, this study suggests
that shareholders should consider buying shares
of Chinese firms which have sufficient amount
of free cash flow and active in the cross-border
mergers and acquisitions. For managers, before
acquiring another company, a firm should have
sufficient amount of free cash flow to anticipate
future costs that might be incurred after the acquisition process has been completed. Finally,
this research should give more insights to the
Chinese government to impose regulations that
promote cross-border mergers and acquisitions.
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